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PROTECTING VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FROM CHRONIC NUISANCE
ORDINANCES
Emily Holtzman1

1

B.A., University of Missouri 2015; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2020; Editor-in-Chief,
Missouri Law Review, 2019–20. I am grateful to Professor Rigel Oliveri for her guidance and support during the
writing of this Article, Professor Mary Beck for her wisdom and assistance in editing this Article and in the Family
Violence Clinic, and Kalila Jackson for her insight.

Abstract

Across the country, chronic nuisance laws effectively punish victims of crime for peace
disturbances. This Article discusses the enforcement of chronic nuisances against victims of
domestic violence and looks specifically at a case from St. Louis, in which a victim of domestic
violence was not only evicted from her home because of the violence inflicted upon her, but
effectively banished from the municipality she resided in as well. This Article further discusses
the history of zoning and nuisance ordinances as tools of discrimination and modern-day
segregation and the way these laws have been used to deny housing to victims of domestic
violence. This Article concludes by discussing and critiquing various state legislation designed
to address the fair housing rights of victims of domestic violence.
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I.

Introduction

Housing security is extremely important for victims of domestic violence given the strong
correlation between abuse and homelessness. Domestic violence is the third leading cause of
homelessness in the nation and 92% of homeless women have experienced severe physical or
sexual abuse in their lifetime.2 In 2016, legal services providers nationwide responded to around
150 cases of victims of domestic violence who were evicted from their homes because of the
abuse they suffered.3 Victims of domestic violence often lack adequate emergency shelter
options – due either to overcrowding or lack of proximity – and as a result victims often return to
their abusers in order to secure housing.4
Chronic nuisance ordinances, sometimes called crime-free ordinances, work to punish or
evict residents for making repeated calls to police within a set period of time, regardless of
whether the resident was the victim of the activity constituting the nuisance.5 These ordinances
exist across the country, and many categorize repeated calls to police as peace disturbances.
When a tenant is a victim of domestic violence, these laws unconscionably force her to choose
between tolerating the abuse without seeking police protection, or alternatively inviting
eviction.6 In 2016, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) issued a
letter of guidance regarding chronic nuisance laws and their impact on victims of domestic
violence,7 but cities have been slow to respond with changes to existing codes. While the ACLU
has settled cases in multiple states regarding chronic nuisance ordinances, this hasn’t led to any
clear-cut rules or substantive law regarding these ordinances and their discriminatory effect.8
This Article argues that victims of domestic violence should have a cause of action under
the Fair Housing Act to challenge chronic nuisance ordinances. Nuisance ordinances that punish
residents for calling the police unfairly target survivors of domestic violence, and because the
majority of survivors are women, these ordinances discriminate against residents on the basis of
sex. Chronic nuisance ordinances come from a long history of zoning laws that target
“undesirable” residents to banish them from cities. Part II of this article discusses this history of
zoning and ordinance law across the country. Part III discusses modern chronic nuisance
ordinances and challenges to these brought under the Fair Housing Act and their connection to
the history of overt racist zoning practices in this country. Part IV provides a case example of
Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing Commission v. City of Maplewood, and the effect of a
2

34 U.S.C. § 12471 (2017).
§ 12471(4).
4
§ 12471(5), (7).
5
While what constitutes a nuisance varies from city to city, chronic nuisances are those that occur repeatedly.
ACLU Women’s Rights Project, Chronic Nuisance and Crime-Free Ordinances: Endangering the Right of
Domestic Violence Survivors to Seek Police Assistance, AM. C.L. UNION,
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/nuisance_ordinance_issue_summary_-_final.pdf [hereinafter ACLU,
Chronic Nuisance].
6
See Sandra Park, Victory! Town Will No Longer Treat Domestic Violence Victims as Nuisances, ACLU (Sept. 8,
2014 4:15 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/victory-town-will-no-longer-treat-domestic-violence-victims-nuisances.
7
U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., Office of General Counsel Guidance on Application of Fair Housing Act
Standards to the Enforcement of Local Nuisance and Crime-Free Housing Ordinances Against Victims of Domestic
Violence, Other Crime Victims, and Others Who Require Police or Emergency Services (Sept. 13, 2016),
https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/FINALNUISANCEORDGDNCE.PDF.
8
I Am Not A Nuisance: Local Ordinances Punish Victims of Crime, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/i-am-notnuisance-local-ordinances-punish-victims-crime?redirect=notanuisance (last visited Jan. 5, 2020) [hereinafter
ACLU, I Am Not A Nuisance].
3
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chronic nuisance ordinance on a resident of Maplewood, Missouri who was a victim of domestic
violence. Part V discusses the role of the legislature in moving forward and argues that while
giving victims a cause of action under the Fair Housing Act is desirable, the best way to protect
victim’s housing rights is to enact blanket legislation that prohibits landlords and municipalities
from evicting residents because of their status as victims of domestic violence. Part VI
concludes this article.

II.

History of Zoning Law

Zoning laws and regulations have been a tool used by the government to control private
land-use since the early 20th century.9 During the industrial revolution, comprehensive zoning
became a way for big urban cities to deal with overcrowding and make plans for the cities’
growth.10 Starting as early as the end of the civil war where newly freed slaves left the South
and moved to Northern and border cities, cities and neighborhoods have also used zoning laws
and land use restrictions to create and further implement racial segregation.11 As African
American families moved away from the South in search of work and safety, white city officials
rushed to implement zoning laws to keep white and black families segregated.12 Ordinances that
disallowed black families from moving into neighborhoods with a majority of white residents,
and vice versa, were common.13
The power of zoning laws and communities’ ability to enact and enforce them derives
mostly from Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty (“Euclid”).14 In Euclid, the Village of Euclid,
Ohio adopted a comprehensive zoning plan that organized the village into six districts and
designated what could be built within these districts.15 Ambler Realty (“Ambler”), a real estate
company, owned sixty-eight acres of land in Euclid that would have been divided into three
different types of districts under the zoning ordinance.16 Ambler sued the Village of Euclid and
asked the court for an injunction to prevent the Village from enforcing this ordinance on the
grounds that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving Ambler of its rights to liberty
and property without due process of law.17 The Northern District of Ohio agreed with Ambler
that the ordinance violated the Fourteenth Amendment, and accordingly struck the ordinance
down.18 The Northern District held that this was further an unconstitutional taking of private
property by the government without “just compensation” and was not a “reasonable or legitimate
9

PATRICIA SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 1:18 (5th ed. 2018) (“Zoning regulations are drafted and enacted
by legislative authority, and may be enforced by municipal action.”).
10
Id. at §§ 1:17, 1:19.
11
RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED
AMERICA 39–43 (2017).
12
Id. at 44.
13
Id.
14
Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
15
Id. at 379–80. The districts were divided as follows: industrial, apartment buildings, two-family houses, singlefamily houses, and designated different height and lot area requirements. The ordinance further designated that
districts construction like hospitals, water towers, public playgrounds, banks, offices, police stations, restaurants,
theaters, gas stations, etc., could be built.
16
Id. at 382.
17
Id. at 384.
18
Ambler Realty Co. v. Vill. of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 317 (1924).
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exercise of police power.”19 In its reasoning, the Court explained that while regulating public
health and safety was a substantial interest of the state, the real purpose of this ordinance was to
further racial segregation.20 The Court accordingly granted the injunction against the Village of
Euclid.21
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court reversed the injunction granted by the
Northern District of Ohio, finding the zoning ordinance a valid and legitimate use of police
power.22 The Court focused the bulk of its analysis on the constitutionality of residential zoning
districts generally and analyzed its constitutionality based on whether it was justified “in some
aspect of the police power, asserted for the public welfare.”23 The Court noted that the majority
trend among state courts was to grant broad authority to municipalities to enforce residential
zoning ordinances.24 In keeping with this trend, the Court found that residential zoning
ordinances like the one at issue are a valid way for municipalities to create safe residential areas
by reducing traffic and noise, thus creating a “more favorable environment in which to rear
children.”25 With this, the Court found that restricting construction of apartment buildings was a
valid way to reach these goals of public safety and peaceful residential areas, since apartment
buildings bring “necessary accompaniments” of more noise, traffic, and businesses.26 These
“accompaniments” would become so obnoxious, in fact, that ultimately “the residential character
of the neighborhood and its desirability as a place of detached residents [would be] utterly
destroyed.”27 The Court described apartment buildings as “mere parasite[s], constructed in order
to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive surroundings created by the residential
character of the district.”28 Because the ordinance was a valid mechanism for achieving goals of
public safety and welfare, the Court found that in “its general scope and dominant features” it
was a valid exercise of the Village’s authority and therefore constitutional.29
Euclid was the first zoning law case to reach the Supreme Court and has been incredibly
influential in the power it gives cities and municipalities to enforce strict comprehensive zoning
laws. In light of this deference afforded to municipalities and the Court’s language depicting
apartment dwellers as “parasites,” many cities began using this to enforce legally discriminatory
zoning laws to implement implicit racial segregation. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,30 Justice
Stewart poignantly noted that “when racial discrimination herds men into ghettos and makes
their ability to buy property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery.”31

19

Id. at 317.
Id. at 313 (“The blighting of property values and the congesting of population, whenever the colored or certain
foreign races invade a residential section, are so well known as to be within the judicial cognizance.”).
21
Id. at 317.
22
Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926).
23
Id. at 387.
24
Id. at 390.
25
Id. at 394.
26
Id. (finding that these “accompaniments” would “detract[t] from . . . safety and depriv[e] children of the privilege
of quiet and open spaces for play”).
27
Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394.
28
Id. at 394.
29
Id. at 397.
30
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
31
Id. at 442−43.
20
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A. Overt Racist Zoning Laws
In Buchanan v. Warley,32 the Supreme Court addressed a Louisville, Kentucky zoning
ordinance that prevented black people from renting or purchasing property in a neighborhood
with a majority of white residents.33 The language of the ordinance read:
An ordinance to prevent conflict and ill-feeling between the white and colored
races in the city of Louisville, and to preserve the public peace and promote the
general welfare, by making reasonable provisions requiring, as far as practicable,
the use of separate blocks or residences, places of abode, and places of assembly
by white and colored people respectively.34
The defendant, an African American man, accepted an offer from the plaintiff, a white man, to
buy a piece of the plaintiff’s land.35 However, because the property purchased was in a
neighborhood with a majority of white residents, the defendant discovered that, pursuant to the
zoning ordinance in Louisville at the time, he would not be able to reside on the land and
therefore did not follow through with the contract.36 The plaintiff then sued for specific
performance, and also argued that the zoning ordinance conflicted with his Fourteenth
Amendment rights to “acquire and enjoy property.”37
The city of Louisville defended the ordinance as necessary to “promote public peace and
promote the general welfare,” and explained that property values of white neighborhoods would
depreciate if black residents moved in.38 The Court recognized that in the past, it has upheld
state actions that exercise state’s use of police power to further these types of goals.39 The Court,
however, finding that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to “free use, enjoyment,
and disposal of a person’s acquisitions,” agreed with the plaintiff that the Louisville ordinance
conflicted with these rights.40 The Court acknowledged that the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to grant equal rights to newly freed slaves after the Civil War – but in reality
the claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment mainly did not focus on race.41 With this
understanding, the Court’s main question became whether or not the white plaintiff could be
denied his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment because the person he wished to sell his land
to was a person of color.42
The Court answered this question in the affirmative, finding that the Louisville ordinance
deprived the plaintiff of his Fourteenth Amendment rights and therefore was unconstitutional.43
32

Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
Id. at 70.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 69.
36
Id. at 70.
37
Id. at 72.
38
Id. at 69, 72; see also Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 365 (1926) (granting cities broad zoning
power).
39
Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 70 (“[T]he authority of the state to pass laws in the exercise of the police power, having for
their object the promotion of the public health, safety and welfare is very broad as has been affirmed in numerous
and recent decisions of this court.”).
40
Id. at 74 (emphasis added).
41
Id. at 76.
42
Id. at 78.
43
Id. at 81.
33
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The Court differentiated this holding from its prior holdings finding segregation in public spaces
and schools constitutional by explaining that in those circumstances because it still provides for
“equal accommodations.”44 The Court further rejected arguments that this ordinance functioned
in a similar way, and worked to maintain the “purity of the races” and prevent “race conflicts,”
stating that the ordinance did not function in this way, and was instead in conflict with the “civil
right of a white man to dispose of his property if he saw fit to do so to a person of color and of a
colored person to make such disposition to a white person.”45 While this case is often seen as a
major landmark in the fight against segregation, it is important to note that the opinion is
centered on the rights of the white landowner in trying to sell his property.46
Despite this landmark ruling in Buchanan, cities ignored this holding and continued to
implement overtly racist practices.47 Cities commonly cited vague interests such as “public
safety and welfare” as the justification for racist ordinances and zoning laws.48 Landowners
often entered into private covenants that allowed for overt discrimination as well.49 After the
passage of the Fair Housing Act in 1968 and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Shelley v. Kraemer –
which held that overtly discriminatory private covenants violated the Fourteenth Amendment –
cities and individuals moved toward more covert practices in the effort to prevent diversification
of cities and neighborhoods.
B. Covert Racist Zoning Laws Post Shelley v. Kraemer and the Fair Housing Act
While the Fair Housing Act of 1968 was a major milestone in the fight for fair housing,
discriminatory practices in housing continue to this day, and communities continue to be
segregated.50 St. Louis provides a good case study to illustrate how the growth of the suburbs,
caused by “white flight,”51 which many cities experienced throughout the 60s, 70s, and 80s was a
response to the invalidation of overtly racist zoning and housing practices. In St. Louis, almost
170,000 residents left the city for the county and outlying suburbs between 1970 and 1980.52
White residents fled the inner city and incorporated municipalities in the county – today there are
eighty-eight municipalities in St. Louis county alone53 – and implemented exclusionary zoning
ordinances in the effort to prevent black residents from moving in.54
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Id.
Id.
46
Id. at 75 (“[T]he question now presented makes it pertinent to inquire into the constitutional right of the white man
to sell his property to a colored man, having in view the legal status of the purchaser and occupant.”).
47
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 11, at 46; see JAMES A. KUSHNER, APARTHEID IN AMERICA: AN HISTORICAL AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS OF CONTEMPORARY RACIAL SEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1980).
48
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 11, at 46.
49
See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); see also Rigel Oliveri, Setting the Stage for Ferguson: Housing
Discrimination and Segregation in St. Louis, 80 MO. L. REV. 1053, 1055–57 (2015).
50
See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Social Engineering: Notes on the Law and Political Economy of Integration, 40
CARDOZO L. REV. 1149, 1152–53 (2019).
51
The phenomenon that when people of color move into a neighborhood, white residents tend to move out and seek
neighborhoods that are predominantly white.
52
Oliveri, supra note 49, at 1062.
53
Municipal Resources, ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI, https://www.stlouisco.com/Your-Government/PublicWorks/Documents/Resources/Municipal.
54
Oliveri, supra note 49, at 1062.
45
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The City of Black Jack is one of these municipalities, and in 1970 it was comprised of
99% white residents.55 At this time, Black Jack was unincorporated and most of its developed
land was made up of mostly single-family dwellings.56 In 1969, the Inter Religious Center for
Urban Affairs (“ICUA”) set out plans to develop a plot of land into two-story townhouses for
people of low and moderate income.57 After these plans became public knowledge, Black Jack
residents pushed for incorporation, which was confirmed by the St. Louis City Council on
August 6, 1970.58 On October 20, 1970, the newly formed City of Black Jack enacted a zoning
ordinance which prohibited the construction of multiple-family dwellings and grandfathered in
any existing multi-family dwellings.59 Soon after the ordinance was enacted, the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) brought charges against the city of
Black Jack for violating the Fair Housing Act, alleging that the ordinance “operated to” exclude
low and moderate income residents from the municipality.60
The Eastern District of Missouri ruled in favor of Black Jack, finding no intent by the
municipality to discriminate on the basis of race.61 On appeal brought by HUD, the Eighth
Circuit reversed and, under a disparate impact theory,62 found Black Jack had violated the Fair
Housing Act.63 While the Eighth Circuit agreed there was no evidence of discriminatory intent
on the part of Black Jack, the court found that the discriminatory effect of the ordinance was
sufficient for HUD to raise a prima facie case of discrimination.64 Specifically, the Eighth
Circuit found the District Court’s ruling to be in error, because it “failed to take into account
either the ‘ultimate effect’ or the ‘historical context’” of Black Jack’s decision to pass the
ordinance.65 The Eighth Circuit found the “ultimate effect” of the ordinance to be
discriminatory, especially “when assessed in light of the fact that segregated housing in the St.
Louis metropolitan area was in large measure the result of deliberate racial discrimination in the
housing market.”66 Within this context, the court found the effects of Black Jack’s ordinance
would be to “foreclose 85 percent of the blacks living in the metropolitan area from obtaining
housing in Black Jack” which would further “confin[e] blacks to low-income housing in the
center city.”67 Because the court found this evidence of discriminatory effect of the ordinance to
be true, it concluded that HUD had raised a prima facie case of discrimination – which could be
rebutted if Black Jack could prove a compelling governmental interest that was furthered by the
ordinance.68
Among the justifications for the ordinance, the City of Black Jack cited “road and traffic
control,” “prevention of overcrowding of schools,” and “prevention of devaluation of adjacent
55

Id.
United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1182 (8th Cir. 1974).
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id. 1183.
60
Id. at 1181.
61
United States v. City of Black Jack, 372 F. Supp. 319, 329 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
62
City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1188.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 1186.
65
Id. (quoting Untied Farmworkers of Florida Hous. Project v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 810 (5th Cir.
1974)).
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
56
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single-family homes.”69 The Eighth Circuit found no “factual basis” that Black Jack’s ordinance
in any way furthered these interests.70 Because of this, the Eighth Circuit held that the City of
Black Jack’s ordinance violated the Fair Housing Act by denying “persons housing on the basis
of race,” and interfering with the “exercise of the right to equal housing opportunity.”71
In many ways, Black Jack is the classic St. Louis story of white flight. White residents
fled the city of St. Louis to surrounding municipalities and did exactly what the residents of
Black Jack attempted to do with its zoning ordinance.72 Today, St. Louis remains split between
the county and the city, and the racial divide of the population runs neatly along these lines.
While Black Jack was an important case for housing rights at the time, cities and municipalities
across the country continued to find ways to keep unwanted residents out of certain communities
based on race, ethnicity, and income status. With the growth of gentrification today, the
movement of residents has reversed, but the effects remain the same.
C. Even More Covert: Gentrification and Urban Housing Crises
Gentrification is classified as the economic transformation of working-class
neighborhoods that is accompanied by an influx of white residents into neighborhoods
historically occupied by a majority of residents of color.73 Some scholars have referred to this
phenomenon as reverse white flight.74 While not exactly a housing practice implemented by a
city or municipality, gentrification has some of the same effects as the exclusionary zoning
practices discussed above in that it drives people of color and low-income families out of
neighborhoods.75 Gentrification is commonplace in most urban areas that attract young people,
and has led to housing crises in major cities like New York and San Francisco, where affordable
housing is essentially non-existent.76 When affluent residents who can afford to pay higher
property taxes and rent move in to communities with lower costs, they drive the housing costs of
those communities up and force out those residents who cannot keep up with the rising costs.77
This dynamic has a major racial component: those moving in are most often white residents and
those forced out are most often minorities.78

69

Id.
Id. at 1187.
71
Id. at 1188.
72
See id. at 1186 (quoting Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., 355 F. Supp. 1257, 1260 (N.D. Ohio 1973)
(Black Jack’s ordinance “confirm[s] the inexorable process whereby the St. Louis metropolitan area becomes one
that ‘has the racial shape of a donut, with the [black residents] in the hole and with mostly [w]hites occupying the
ring.’”).
73
David Troutt, Cities, Fair Housing, and Gentrification: A Proposal in Progressive Federalism, 40 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1177, 1178 (2019).
74
See Hannah Weinstein, Fighting For a Place Called Home: Litigation Strategies for Challenging Gentrification,
62 UCLA L. REV. 794 (2015).
75
Troutt, supra note 73, at 1178.
76
See Kim Barker, Behind New York’s Housing Crisis: Weakened Laws and Fragmented Regulations, N.Y. TIMES
(May 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/05/20/nyregion/affordable-housing-nyc.html; Michelle
Robertson, A Citywide Crisis in Gentrification? New SF Residents Make Far More Money Than Those Leaving, SF
GATE (April 16, 2018), https://www.sfgate.com/expensive-san-francisco/article/Who-s-moving-to-San-FranciscoThe-rich-the-12805760.php.
77
Weinstein, supra note 74, at 796.
78
Id.
70
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Scholars have pointed to gentrification as a threat to fair housing in the way that it drives
low income residents out of neighborhoods they may have occupied for generations.79 While it
may be the most covert in terms of discriminatory housing practices discussed above, its effects
are the same on already marginalized communities. In theory, gentrification can look good for
cities – it draws in business, drives the tax base up, and can bring much needed attention to areas
of cities that have long been ignored. But in reality, the effects of gentrification essentially
amount to modern day segregation.
Closely connected with gentrification are chronic nuisance ordinances because cities
often adopt these types of ordinances in the name of public safety, and can use this as a draw for
young, affluent residents to gentrify lower income neighborhoods.80 Because chronic nuisance
ordinances are typically selectively enforced against minority communities, they too work to
create a similar modern-day segregation.

III.

Modern Chronic Nuisance Ordinances

While states and cities may define what constitutes a nuisance differently, chronic
nuisances are those nuisances that occur repeatedly but do not themselves constitute crimes.81
Chronic nuisances are often paired with other anti-crime ordinances, and are sometimes referred
to as “crime-free” ordinances.82 In Missouri, for example, a nuisance is defined as the
“unreasonable, unusual, or unnatural use of one’s property so that it substantially impairs the
right of another to peacefully enjoy his property.”83 Cities and municipalities typically define
nuisances in municipal codes, and Maplewood, Missouri, for example, identifies twenty-nine
different types of nuisances in the city’s municipal code.84 In the St. Louis area, 69 of the 88
municipalities include repeated police calls in their nuisance ordinances.85
Chronic nuisance ordinances allow cities to punish residents that need what the city
considers “excessive police service.”86 Proponents of chronic nuisance ordinances see these
laws as essential to keeping their communities safe and to insure desirable living spaces for
prospective residents and property owners.87 Stories of victims of crime suffering the brunt end
of these ordinances are abundant,88 but cities have been slow to change these laws. The police
chief of Oak Park, a neighborhood of Chicago, explained that the crime-free ordinance there has
79

Troutt, supra note 73, at 1178. Professor Troutt makes the argument that gentrification is a fair housing problem,
and as such should be afforded remedies under the Fair Housing Act.
80
Anna Kastner, The Other War at Home; Chronic Nuisance Laws and the Revictimization of Survivors of Domestic
Violence, 103 CAL. L. REV. 1047, 1066 (2015).
81
ACLU, Chronic Nuisance, supra note 5.
82
Id.
83
Frank v. Envtl. Sanitation Mgmt., 687 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
84
MAPLEWOOD, MO., MUNICIPAL CODE § 34-240 (2012).
85
Kalila Jackson, Dismantling the Divide: Crime-free Nuisance Ordinances are a Public Menace, ST. LOUIS
AMERICAN (July 18, 2018), http://www.stlamerican.com/news/columnists/guest_columnists/dismantling-the-dividecrime-free-nuisance-ordinances-are-a-public/article_0e8eef4c-8a8f-11e8-92c8-2f9aa8002b90.html.
86
Cari Fais, Denying Access to Justice: The Cost of Applying Chronic Nuisance Laws to Domestic Violence, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 1181, 1182 (2008).
87
John H. Campbell, Solving Chronic Nuisance Problems: A Guide for Neighborhood Leaders, ENTERPRISE FOUND.
INC. at 2 (2001), https://www.enterprisecommunity.org/download?fid=6702&nid=3548.
88
Id. at 16.
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helped to evict tenants for drug-related crimes.89 In his book, Evicted, Matthew Desmond
challenges a similar Milwaukee crime-free ordinance that was justified as an “effective weapon”
in prosecuting drug crimes.90 However, of the 1,666 nuisances that received citations in
Milwaukee, only four percent involved drug-related crimes, while domestic violence was the
third most common nuisance cited.91 Critics also argue that crime free ordinances like this are
enforced disproportionately against African American residents and effectively criminalize
poverty.92 In recent years, these ordinances have also been the center of fair housing litigation.
A. Housing Discrimination Claims Under the Fair Housing Act
The Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) prohibits landlords from refusing to sell or rent or to
“otherwise make unavailable or deny” a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion,
sex, familial status, or national origin.93 The statute also makes it unlawful to discriminate
against any person based on these protected characteristics in the “terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling.”94 The FHA offers three enforcement mechanisms to
handle claims: (1) complaints can be brought to HUD, (2) private actions can be filed in court,
or (3) suits may be brought by the Justice Department.95
Most claims brought under the FHA may be brought under two main theories: disparate
treatment and disparate impact.96 Courts use a similar framework to analyze claims of
discrimination in employment and those in housing discrimination.97 For a disparate treatment
claim, a plaintiff must prove that a discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the
defendant’s decision.98 In cases brought under the FHA, courts evaluate the claims using the
McDonnell Douglas99 burden-shifting framework, which was originally created for employment
discrimination cases.100
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green101 was an intentional employment discrimination
case brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act which reached the Supreme Court. In its
opinion, the Court created the burden shifting framework for discrimination claims brought
under a disparate treatment theory.102 Under this framework, a plaintiff must first plead a prima
facie case of discrimination.103 Once a plaintiff pleads this prima facie case, raising an inference
89

Phil Kadner, Victims of Crime Hurt by Crime-Free Laws, CHI. TRIB.: DAILY SOUTHTOWN (Feb. 26, 2015),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/daily-southtown/opinion/ct-sta-kadner-tenants-st-0227-20150226column.html.
90
MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED 373 n.6 (2016).
91
Id. at 191, 373 n. 6.
92
Id.
93
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012).
94
§ 3604(b).
95
42 U.S.C. §§ 3610, 3613, 3614 (2012).
96
§ 3604(f); Anderson v. City of Blue Ash, 798 F.3d 338, 360 (6th Cir. 2015).
97
Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 946–47 (8th Cir. 2010); DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir.
1996); Meister v. Kansas City, No. 09-2544-EFM, 2011 WL 765887 (D. Kan. 2011).
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of discrimination, the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant to articulate a “legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employees’ rejection” to rebut this inference.104 Because this is
only a burden of persuasion, the defendant only needs to articulate this reason.105 The burden
then shifts back to the plaintiff to argue that the defendant’s offered reason is pretext for a
discriminatory action.106
In the housing discrimination context, a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of
intentional discrimination by showing: (1) they are a member of a protected class, (2) they
sought and were qualified to rent or purchase housing, (3) they were rejected, and (4) the housing
opportunity remained available to other renters or purchasers.107 Discriminatory intent is not
required to establish a violation of the FHA.108 Under a disparate impact theory, a plaintiff must
establish that the practices the plaintiff challenges have a “disproportionately adverse effect on
minorities and are otherwise unjustified by a legitimate rationale.”109 The purpose of disparate
impact claims is to punish practices which have discriminatory consequences in addition to those
that are intentionally discriminatory.110
Disparate impact claims brought under the FHA similarly get their foundation from those
in the employment context and Griggs v. Duke Power Co.111 In Texas Dept. of Housing and
Comm. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, (“Inclusive Communities”), the Supreme Court
established that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA.112 Under a disparate
impact theory, a plaintiff must establish that the practice or decision the plaintiff challenges has a
“disproportionately adverse effect” on a protected class of people and are “otherwise unjustified
by a legitimate rationale.”113 A plaintiff may prove this disproportionately adverse effect by
showing a statistical disparity resulting from a facially neutral policy or action taken by the
defendant.114 In Inclusive Communities, the Court held that a plaintiff must meet a “robust
causality requirement” in showing the connection between the statistical disparity and the
defendant’s policy.115 A defendant in a disparate impact case may defend its policy by proving
that it is necessary to “achieve a valid interest.”116 The Court further noted the importance of
allowing disparate impact claims under the FHA for specifically challenging zoning laws and
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other restrictions that “function unfairly to exclude minorities from certain neighborhoods
without any sufficient justification.”117
Claims brought under the FHA challenging chronic nuisances have mostly been split
between disparate treatment and disparate impact claims.
B. Housing Discrimination and Victims of Domestic Violence
Bouley v. Young-Sabourin was one of the early cases brought under the FHA by a
survivor of domestic violence.118 The plaintiff in Bouley was evicted for disturbing the peace
after her husband attacked her in her apartment and she called the police.119 After this incident,
the plaintiff’s landlord (defendant) sent the plaintiff a notice of eviction for violating terms of the
lease, specifically, a provision that stated, “tenant will not use or allow said premises or any part
thereof to be used for unlawful purposes, in any noisy, boisterous or other manner offensive to
any other occupant of the building.” 120 The landlord also stated that she and others residing in
the apartment building were fearful of the “violent behaviors expressed.”121
The plaintiff claimed that the defendant unlawfully terminated the plaintiff’s lease on the
basis of sex, and the United States District Court for the District of Vermont allowed the plaintiff
to proceed with this claim.122 The Court agreed with plaintiff’s argument that her status as a
victim of domestic violence fell within the protected category of sex.123 The Court further found
that the plaintiff plead a prima facie case of intentional discrimination because the defendant
evicted the plaintiff just three days after the plaintiff was attacked by her abuser, and because the
defendant had no other evidence of problems with the plaintiff as a tenant.124 Accordingly, the
Court dismissed the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.125
Since Bouley, a number of courts have allowed plaintiffs to pursue claims under the FHA
arising from discrimination based on the plaintiff’s status as a victim of domestic violence.126
Scholars have also made the argument that because women are the majority of survivors of
domestic violence, discrimination against survivors of domestic violence should therefore equate
to sex discrimination.127 In Meister v. Kansas City, the plaintiff brought claims under the FHA
and the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”)128 after she was evicted from her Section 8
apartment for property damage resulting from an attack by her abuser.129 About two weeks after
117
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the plaintiff’s former partner attacked her, breaking windows and ripping blinds, the plaintiff
received a letter from her landlord that her lease would be terminated early because of this
property damage, which violated her federal voucher agreement.130 The court found that under
Bouley, the plaintiff could state a claim of intentional sex discrimination against the landlord
under the FHA because she was a victim of domestic violence and because the circumstantial
evidence was sufficient to plead a prima facie case.131 The court denied summary judgment to
the defendant and allowed the plaintiff to proceed with her claims.132
The ACLU has settled cases across the country regarding nuisance ordinances that have
functioned to evict victims of domestic violence for calling the police.133 The ACLU has also
strongly advocated for legislation to explicitly outlaw ordinances like these, and a few states
have enacted statutes creating special protections for victims of domestic violence to deter
housing discrimination. While Bouley was an important decision for victims of domestic
violence facing housing discrimination, the protections in place under the FHA for victims of
domestic violence remain somewhat murky, especially given the power cities and municipalities
have when enacting nuisance ordinances. Without substantive or blanket laws on the issue,
courts still mostly have the discretion to determine whether or not a FHA claim brought by a
victim of domestic violence constitutes sex or race discrimination.

IV.

Case Study: Rosetta Watson and Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing Authority
v. Maplewood

Rosetta Watson was a resident of Maplewood, Missouri from September 2011 until she
was banished from the city in February 2012.134 Watson was repeatedly abused by her former
boyfriend, Robert Hemmings, and called the police on Hemmings at least four times while living
at her home in Maplewood.135 In March, 2012, the City of Maplewood held a hearing against
Watson, concluding that her numerous calls to police due to domestic violence constituted a
public nuisance pursuant to Maplewood’s municipal code.136 The City revoked Watson’s
occupancy permit,137 evicted her from her home, and effectively expelled her from Maplewood
entirely.138
In March 2012, Rosetta Watson received notice from Maplewood Assistant City Manager
Anthony Traxler that a hearing was scheduled later that month to determine whether Watson’s
“situation,” or repeated calls to police, constituted a nuisance.139 The purpose of the hearing was
to determine if the city of Maplewood should revoke Watson’s occupancy permit, which allowed
her to live in Maplewood.140 While occupancy permits are typically required of landlords or
130
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property managers, Maplewood, along with other St. Louis municipalities, is unique in that any
person who wants to reside in Maplewood must obtain an occupancy permit issued by the
director of public works.141 If an occupancy permit is revoked, a resident cannot live anywhere
in Maplewood.142 The application for a permit is created at the discretion of the public works
director, and noncompliance with the Maplewood municipal code is grounds for revocation of an
occupancy permit.143
At the hearing, Traxler presented evidence of continuing “peace disturbance and/or
domestic violence resulting in numerous calls to police,” at Watson’s residence, and that these
occurrences put Maplewood police officers “at risk.”144 Traxler concluded that these incidents
constituted a public nuisance and decided to revoke Watson’s occupancy permit for six
months.145 Specifically, Traxler found that Watson violated section 34-240(17)(f) of
Maplewood’s municipal code, which categorizes as a nuisance “[m]ore than two instances within
a 180-day period of incidents of peace disturbance or domestic violence resulting in calls [sic] to
the police.”146
The ACLU of Missouri filed a federal lawsuit against the City of Maplewood on
Watson’s behalf, arguing that the City’s nuisance policy as defined in its municipal code was
unconstitutional.147 Watson and the ACLU settled with the City of Maplewood in September
2018, and as part of the settlement agreement Maplewood agreed to amend sections 34-240 and
34-242 of its municipal code.148 The amendment deleted the section of the ordinance that
defined more than two instances within a 180-day period of domestic violence resulting in calls
to police as a nuisance.149 The amendment also adds a section to the code that clearly states that
the City of Maplewood cannot revoke an occupancy permit or otherwise punish a resident if that
resident was the victim of the “incidents that formed the basis of the nuisance enforcement
action,” or if that resident called the police.150 This section of the amendment further states that
with each enforcement action, the City of Maplewood must make a finding as to whether or not
the resident was a victim of the nuisance.151
A few months prior to the ACLU’s suit against Maplewood, Metropolitan St. Louis
Equal Housing and Opportunity Council (“EHOC”), a non-profit fair housing enforcement
agency in St. Louis, filed a similar suit against Maplewood for this nuisance ordinance, arguing
141
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instead that it constituted housing discrimination.152 The same section of the municipal code that
Maplewood used to evict Rosetta Watson was the subject of EHOC’s case against the City of
Maplewood.153 EHOC argued that Maplewood enforced this ordinance in a discriminatory
fashion in violation of the federal FHA154 and the Missouri Human Rights Act.155 Specifically,
EHOC presented evidence that Maplewood enforced the nuisance ordinance disproportionately
against victims of domestic violence, African-American residents, and people with disabilities.156
EHOC delved into the racialized history of zoning law in St. Louis to make its claim that
Maplewood, which was almost entirely white until the 1970s, intentionally discriminated against
African-American residents and victims of domestic violence by disproportionately enforcing the
nuisance ordinance.157 EHOC cited Maplewood’s records on enforcement of the nuisance
ordinance and found an “alarmingly high” amount of enforcement against victims of domestic
violence.158 Of the sixteen enforcement hearings held for violation of the nuisance ordinance
due to domestic disturbances, six of these were enforcement actions against residents who were
victims of domestic violence – their nuisance being attacks by their abusers.159 In all six of these
enforcement actions, the residents were African-American women.160 EHOC argued that
Maplewood enforced this nuisance ordinance in a discriminatory manner to effect its purpose of
driving African-American residents out in order to maintain the municipality as prominently
white.161
EHOC further alleged that because of the unique requirement that residents obtain an
occupancy permit to buy or rent housing in Maplewood, the disproportionate enforcement of the
nuisance ordinance not only evicted victims of domestic violence from their homes in a
discriminatory fashion, but it also effectively banned them from the city altogether.162
EHOC brought its FHA claims under both disparate treatment and disparate impact
theories.163 For the disparate treatment claim, EHOC alleged that Maplewood intentionally
targeted African-American persons and women by enforcing the chronic nuisance ordinance.164
As circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination, EHOC cited its statistical study which
found that the nuisance ordinance was enforced against African-American women more
frequently than white residents and that every victim of domestic violence who was evicted
pursuant to the ordinance was an African-American woman.165 EHOC also cited to the City of
Maplewood’s website, which states that, “[o]ver the past decade, Maplewood’s central location
152
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and housing values have brought many young professionals and their families to our
community,” to argue that Maplewood was intentionally driving out African-American residents
to “lure” more affluent white residents to the city.166
For the disparate impact claim, EHOC argued that the definition of nuisance in
Maplewood’s municipal code had a disparate impact on victims of domestic violence and
African-Americans.167 EHOC claimed that the nuisance ordinances served “no legitimate
purpose,” and the proposed goals of the nuisance ordinance – safety, public health, etc. – could
be achieved in a non-discriminatory fashion.168
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted Maplewood’s Rule
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss EHOC’s claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted for both the disparate treatment and disparate impact claims.169 The Court held that
where EHOC could not provide evidence of intentional discrimination aside from “conclusory
assertions and conjecture” of discrimination, it could not proceed with a disparate treatment
theory under the FHA.170 Specifically, the Court did not find that EHOC raised sufficient
evidence of Maplewood’s discriminatory intent to even raise a disparate treatment claim.171 The
Court rejected EHOC’s statistics as evidence of disproportionate enforcement of the nuisance
ordinance.172 While the Court noted that at the pleading stage, a plaintiff is not required to prove
discrimination, it concluded that EHOC failed to produce sufficient evidence to create even an
inference that Maplewood enforced the nuisance ordinance in a way that resulted in unfavorable
treatment to residents based on sex, race, or disability.173 Accordingly, the Court determined that
EHOC failed to state a claim that “nudge[d] its claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.”174
The Court further held that where EHOC could not provide sufficient statistical evidence
to prove a causal connection between the alleged discriminatory policy and the statistical data
presented, it could not proceed with a disparate impact theory under the FHA.175 Taking into
account the protections given to defendants in disparate impact housing discrimination cases set
out in Inclusive Communities, the Court found that EHOC failed to meet the “robust causality
requirement” in this case.176 The Court determined that EHOC failed to prove that the nuisance
ordinance caused the statistical disparity resulting from enforcement of the ordinance.177 The
Court thus held that EHOC failed to set forth sufficient factual allegations to state a prima facie
case of disparate impact discrimination and accordingly granted Maplewood’s 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss this claim.178
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Both Rosetta Watson’s claims and EHOC’s claims against the City of Maplewood
targeted the exact same provision of the City’s municipal code. While Watson ultimately settled
her claims with the City, the Eastern District of Missouri did not grant Maplewood’s 12(b)(6)
motion in that case as it did in EHOC’s case. While this could be due to a number of factors –
different judges, Watson’s claims involved an actual person – this difference demonstrates the
need for more substantive law prohibiting chronic nuisance ordinances, like the one at issue in
these cases.

V.

Future Impact and the Role of Legislature

This Part argues that the Eastern District of Missouri should have allowed EHOC to
proceed with its FHA claims against Maplewood. Chronic nuisance ordinances, like the one in
Maplewood, violate the FHA because they unlawfully discriminate against victims of domestic
violence. Because courts have differed in their interpretations of the FHA and how domestic
violence victims fall within it, and because the numerous settlements with municipalities across
the country have not created much substantive law on the issue, this Part concludes with policy
suggestions for states to adopt and enforce greater protections for victims of domestic violence.
A. EHOC Should Have Been Able to Proceed With Its Claims Against Maplewood
EHOC specifically should have been allowed to proceed on its disparate treatment claim
against Maplewood, and the Court’s decision to grant Maplewood’s 12(b)(6) motion on this
claim was improper.
EHOC presented statistical evidence showing that Maplewood
disproportionately enforced the nuisance ordinance against women who were victims of
domestic violence, as well as against African American residents.179 Under the McDonnell
Douglas burden shifting framework, this was sufficient circumstantial evidence to raise a prima
facie case of intentional discrimination.180 The court noted that EHOC’s statistical showing
presented an “imbalance resulting from enforcement of the ordinance,” and this finding should
have been enough to at least withstand a 12(b)(6) motion.181
The Court similarly erred in granting Maplewood’s 12(b)(6) motion for EHOC’s
disparate impact claim. While EHOC was required to meet the “robust causality requirement”
set out in Inclusive Communities, the Court failed to appreciate the complexity of the relationship
between the zoning ordinance and the statistical disparities EHOC presented. In Inclusive
Communities, the Supreme Court noted that disparate impact claims under the FHA allow
plaintiffs to “counteract unconscious prejudices and disguised animus that escape easy
classification as disparate treatment” and “prevent segregated housing patterns that might
otherwise result from covert and illicit stereotyping.”182 While the Court further stated that
disparate impact theory is meant to remove “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers,” it is
not intended to displace “valid governmental policies.”183
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The Court in EHOC essentially conducted no inquiry into the validity of the nuisance
ordinance, other than stating it was adopted to “promote public health, safety, and welfare.”184
This is the same standard, boiler plate, essentially meaningless language used to defend zoning
policy seen in Buchanan. The Court cited no evidence, however, that the nuisance ordinance in
fact promoted any of these goals. In Inclusive Communities, the Supreme Court explained that
an important step in analyzing a disparate impact claim is to give the defendant the opportunity
to “state and explain the valid interest served by their policies.”185 In the one sentence that the
Court dedicates to this analysis in its decision to dismiss the claims, it states vague policy
interests and fails to explain how the ordinance at issue actually served those interests.186
Because this inquiry deserved at least a more thorough analysis beyond the pleading stage, the
Court should have denied Maplewood’s 12(b)(6) motion for the disparate impact claim.
Although amended pursuant to the settlement agreement with Rosetta Watson,
Maplewood city officials still retain considerable discretion in decisions to revoke residents’
occupancy permits. While the amendments specifically state that a resident’s occupancy permit
cannot be revoked if the resident was the victim of the activity that caused the nuisance,
determination of whether the resident was a victim is left to the same hearing process that was
used to revoke Rosetta Watson’s occupancy permit. The amendments also do not specify how
this will be handled if the victim and perpetrator of the nuisance live together.
Rosetta Watson’s settlement was approved by the Maplewood City Council in September
2018.187 While these changes are certainly a win in the fight for secure housing for victims of
domestic violence, this is just one small battle in a much bigger war. St. Louis alone is home to
88 different municipalities, and a majority of them still have crime-free nuisance ordinances on
their books.188 Considering the strong correlation between domestic violence and homelessness
discussed above,189 victims of domestic violence deserve better protections and assistance in
securing safe housing.
B. Role of Legislature Moving Forward
While some courts have allowed victims of domestic violence to proceed under FHA
claims, such judicial action does not guarantee protection from housing discrimination for
victims across the country. Further, proceeding under the FHA forces victims of domestic
violence to shoehorn their claims as either sex or race discrimination – when the real issue is that
these victims are being punished and effectively re-victimized because of their status as
victims.190 Various states and cities have implemented laws and ordinances specifically
184

Metro. St. Louis Equal Hous. & Opportunity Council, No. 4:17CV886, at *5.
Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 135 S.Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015).
186
Metro. St. Louis Equal Hous. & Opportunity Council, No. 4:17CV886, at *5 (“Here, the policy complained of is
a nuisance ordinance enacted to promote public health, safety, and welfare.”).
187
Nassim Benchaabane, Evicting Domestic Violence Victims is Out in Maplewood, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH
(Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/evicting-domestic-violence-victims-is-outin-maplewood/article_672c0f90-1161-51e0-b501-fc11061f9aa9.html.
188
See supra notes 52−53 and accompanying text.
189
See supra notes 2−4 and accompanying text.
190
Forcing victims to categorize their claims as sex discrimination also presents other difficulties. Even though the
majority of victims of domestic violence are women, men are still victims as well and as it stands now, under the
FHA, a victim of domestic violence who is a man would likely have no grounds to pursue a discrimination claim.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601−3631.
185

61

protecting victims of domestic violence from housing discrimination, and these laws should
serve as guidelines for other states moving forward. The best way to ensure protections for
victims of domestic violence is to implement blanket prohibitions like these so that judges are
not given sole discretion to decide whether victims may bring their claims.
In Colorado, for example, the legislature has carved out an exception for victims of
domestic violence in its statute addressing termination of tenancy for substantial violations.191
The statute states that a landlord has no basis to evict a victim of domestic violence where
“domestic violence or domestic abuse was the cause of or resulted in the alleged substantial
violation.”192 The Colorado statute requires documentation of the abuse for the protection to
apply.193 The statute also makes it unlawful for a landlord to evict a tenant for a substantial
violation caused by a guest or invitee for which the tenant immediately notified law enforcement
officials.194 A Minnesota statute similarly prohibits landlords from imposing any penalty against
a resident for calling the police “in response to domestic abuse or any other conduct.”195 The
statute goes one step further by prohibiting a landlord from barring or limiting a tenant’s right to
call for police assistance in an emergency situation.196
The City of Philadelphia has also enhanced protections for victims of domestic violence
in its Fair Housing Ordinance.197 This ordinance makes it unlawful for a landlord to terminate a
tenant’s lease in retaliation for an incident of domestic violence or sexual assault in which the
tenant was the victim.198 This ordinance also allows victims of domestic violence to terminate a
lease regardless of whether the term of the lease has expired.199 [This is crucial for victims who
live with abusive partners and want to leave them without having to worry about paying double
rent, as well as victims who just wish to change residences to prevent an abusive partner from
knowing where they live.] At least nine other jurisdictions across the country have enacted some
type of protection for victims of domestic violence, or victims of crime overall, from eviction.200
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defense to an eviction action if the tenant was a victim of domestic violence and has filed for a protective order,

62

This type of legislation is crucial because it effectively precludes private landlords and
municipalities from enforcing chronic nuisance ordinances against victims of domestic violence.
These laws are important in helping victims secure safe housing, and states across the country
should use existing laws as guidelines for drafting legislation. Missouri, and St. Louis in
particular, is plagued by a century of racialized zoning and is now seeing the effects of increased
gentrification. As such, the state should seek to adopt similar protections to ensure fair housing
for all residents.
While this type of legislation is important, most statutes simply provide a victim of
domestic violence with a defense against eviction, meaning that judges still have the discretion to
decide if a victim can remain in her home.201 Further, some of these statutes still fail to take into
account the complexities of abusive relationships because they do not allow a defense if the
tenant is a victim of domestic violence who has not already received a restraining or protective
order, or if the victim allows the abuser back on the premises.202 Oregon, for example, dedicates
an entire section of its Residential and Landlord statute to protections for victims of domestic
violence.203 The section prohibits a landlord from evicting or otherwise punishing a tenant
because that tenant was a victim of domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking.204 However, a
landlord may evict the tenant if the landlord has given the tenant a written warning, and the
tenant “permits or consents to the perpetrator’s presence on the premises.”205
This kind of exception fails to consider the difficulty victims experience in dealing with
an abusive partner. Domestic violence is a crime of control – victims of domestic violence are
often under a “coercive control” at the hands of their abusers.206 Abusers can intimidate victims
and create feelings of fear and dependence on the abuser.207 Those unfamiliar with the complex
psychological trauma that accompanies physical abuse might wonder why victims repeatedly
forgive their abusers or let them back into their homes. However, there is a repetitive cycle of
violence that is common in many abusive relationships and is defined by a period of tension
building where the abuser might be irritable or verbally abusive, followed by an “acute
explosion,” in which the abuser might physically and/or sexually abuse the victim or others close

without a protective order the court has discretion whether or not to evict the tenant); OR. REV. STAT. § 90.449
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201
PHILADELPHIA, PA. MUNICIPAL CODE § 9-804(2)(d) (2011).
202
Id.
203
OR. REV. STAT. § 90.449 (2018).
204
OR. REV. STAT. § 90.449(1)(a).
205
OR. REV. STAT. § 90.449(3)(a).
206
Evan Stark, Current Controversies: Coercive Control, in SOURCEBOOK ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 26 (3d
ed., 2018).
207
Id. at 27.

63

to the victim, followed by a honeymoon period where the abuser might apologize and promise to
never become violent again.208
States that have enacted legislation granting protections to victims of domestic violence
from eviction are moving in the right direction. However, punishing victims for allowing their
abusers back in their lives not only undermines these protections, but also contributes to the
culture of victim-blaming that is so present in our culture today. At the heart of nuisance
ordinances that function to punish victims of domestic violence is a victim-blaming culture that
is deeply ingrained in our society. Victims of domestic violence are often blamed for their own
abuse and questioned for not leaving their abusers. Victims of domestic violence are victims of
crime, and they should not be punished for crimes committed against them. Legislators across
the country must unlearn this deep-seated victim-blaming to better understand the complexities
of abusive relationships and draft more effective legislation to ensure protections for victims of
domestic violence.209
VI.

Conclusion

One in four women have been victims of severe physical violence by an intimate partner
in their lifetime, and on a typical day more than 20,000 phone calls are placed to domestic
violence hotlines nationwide.210 Leaving an abuser is the most dangerous time for a victim of
domestic violence and is most often the event that precedes domestic homicide.211 Women are
substantially more likely to be killed by an intimate partner than men, and in 2010, two out of
every five murder victims were killed by an intimate partner.212 Chronic nuisance ordinances
that punish tenants for calling the police effectively force victims to choose between being
evicted from their homes or suffering domestic abuse, or worse, death at the hands of their
abuser. Victims choose not to seek police assistance at times when they are most vulnerable to
violent abuse or even homicide in an effort to keep their homes.213 Deeply entrenched
mentalities of victim blaming are at the heart of these chronic nuisance ordinances. Considering
the strong correlation between domestic violence and homelessness, the effects of these
ordinances do not align with the fair housing goals of this country and reflect the history of
zoning and nuisance ordinances used for discriminatory purposes to keep “undesirables” out of
communities. States and cities across the country should push for further legislative action to
protect victims of domestic violence from these types of nuisance ordinances so that they can
receive the emergency assistance they need and not be left out on the streets.
208
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Moving forward, Missouri and other jurisdictions should adopt legislature similar to the
statutes described above in Colorado, Minnesota, and Oregon. Legislators should work closely
with experts on domestic violence to avoid provisions, like those in Oregon’s statute, that allow
punishment of victims for allowing their abusers back into their lives. Victims of domestic
violence need support from their legislators and communities alike to maintain safe places to
live. Fair housing laws that support victims will be an important step in destroying the victimblaming mindset that leads cities and neighborhoods to classify victims of domestic violence as
“undesirables.”
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